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CIRCUMVENTING AUTHORITY: LOOPHOLES 
IN THE DMCA’S ACCESS CONTROLS 
ADAM L. RUCKER1
ABSTRACT 
In a world where digital pirates freely roam the internet, 
seemingly plundering at will, the providers of digital content must 
find a way to protect their valuable assets.  Digital fences afford 
that protection—but not very well.  Fortunately (for content 
owners), 17 U.S.C. § 1201, passed as part of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, was designed to fill the 
numerous gaps in those fences by forbidding activities designed to 
circumvent them.  In its present state, however, § 1201 does not 
adequately serve that purpose.  Substantial flaws in the language of 
the statute render it virtually powerless to thwart piracy.  If § 1201 
is to fulfill its intended role (without the need for creative judicial 
interpretation), it must be amended to rectify the discrepancies 
between Congress’ supposed intent and the language it chose. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In response to the spectacular technological advances that were 
ushered in as part of the “digital millennium,” Congress felt the need to pass 
legislation that would help ensure U.S. dominance in the global 
marketplace.2  Realizing that today’s media is, by virtue of its digital nature, 
more readily pirated than its analog predecessors, Congress focused its 
attention on technological measures designed to prevent unauthorized 
access to digital content.3  As part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”),4 Congress passed legislation making it illegal to circumvent the 
“digital barbed wire” content owners had begun attaching to their 
copyrighted works. 
¶2 The idea was simple: unless it is illegal to break through the digital 
fence, one resourceful hacker could potentially thwart an entire protection 
scheme by distributing the virtual wire cutters to the public with impunity.  
By attaching legal sanctions to both the act of cutting the wires and 
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2009; M.S. Neuroscience, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2005; B.S. Agricultural Biotechnology & 
Biology, University of Kentucky, 2002. 
2 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1 (1998). 
3 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
4 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
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supplying the wire cutters, Congress hoped to ward off potential pirates and 
provide an extra incentive for content owners to use technological access 
controls.5 
¶3 However simple the idea, it has proven difficult to implement.  The 
statutory language of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions currently 
contains two major loopholes—both are found within the statutory 
definitions.6  Thus far, only one court has taken the opportunity to present 
an in-depth textual analysis of either of these key provisions.7  However, 
given the controversy surrounding the DMCA’s access controls, Congress 
would be wise to pay these loopholes strict attention—for their shrewd 
opponents (the pirates) surely will. 
I. THE BIRTH OF COPYRIGHT ACCESS CONTROLS 
¶4 Depending on one’s personal vision of the appropriate level of 
copyright protection and the propriety of policy-laundering, the way in 
which the DMCA was implemented is either brilliant or ludicrous. 
¶5 Shortly after his inauguration in 1992, President Bill Clinton 
appointed an “Information Infrastructure Task Force” to help develop his 
administration’s policy regarding the Information Superhighway.8  Bruce 
A. Lehman, the newly-appointed Assistant Secretary of Commerce and 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, chaired the task force’s 
intellectual property Working Group.9  Commissioner Lehman, who had 
previously served as an attorney for the computer software industry,10 
quickly began working to provide copyright holders with “as much legal 
control as possible over digital content.”11  When his efforts to push 
legislation through Congress were met by strong opposition from groups 
such as the Digital Future Coalition,12 Lehman turned to the international 
community for (covert) assistance.13  “He focused his attention on getting 
his agenda adopted by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
                                                     
5 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8. 
6 See infra pp. 12–19. 
7 I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 
521, 531–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that the unauthorized use of a legitimate 
password does not amount to “circumvention” under § 1201). 
8 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 90 (2001). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and 
Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 121, 130 (2006). 
12 LITMAN, supra note 8, at 124–25. 
13 Id. at 129. 
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(“WIPO”) member nations, reasoning that when the United States signed 
the treaty, Congress would be obliged to adopt implementing legislation.”14 
¶6 Adopted in 1996, the WIPO Copyright Treaty15 requires member 
countries to implement “adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that 
are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their [copy]rights.”16  
Even though then-current U.S. law arguably met the standards adopted by 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, “Congress used the Treaty as an excuse to 
implement a much more sweeping ban on circumvention.” 17  The result 
was 17 U.S.C. § 1201.18 
II. A (VERY) BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
¶7 At the dawn of the digital millennium, Congress realized that if the 
law was to keep pace with the spectacular technological advances of 
society, it “must adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to 
disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials.”19  Congress hailed § 1201 
as an avenue for “quickly and conveniently” exposing the internet 
generation to “the movies, music, software, and literary works that are the 
fruit of American creative genius.”20  It was designed to provide the 
protection and legal framework necessary to establish American dominance 
in the “global digital on-line marketplace for copyrighted works.”21 
¶8 “The copyright industries are one of America[’]s largest and fastest 
growing economic assets.”22  They “contribute more to the U.S. economy 
and employ more workers than any single manufacturing sector, including 
chemicals, industrial equipment, electronics, food processing, textiles and 
apparel, and aircraft.”23  Indeed, in 1996, the copyright industries accounted 
for more foreign sales and exports than any other major industry sector.24 
¶9 The anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201 were intended to 
“encourage[] technological solutions” to piracy by providing legal sanctions 
                                                     
14 Id. 
15 Wipo Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996) with the Agreed Statements of the 
Diplomatic Conference That Adopted the Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]. 
16 Id. at art. 11. 
17 Herman & Gandy, supra note 11, at 131. 
18 Id. 
19 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1 (1998). 
20 Id. at 6. 
21 See id. at 1. 
22 Id. at 7. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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against the circumvention of such technology.25  Realizing that “what may 
be encrypted or scrambled often may be decrypted or unscrambled,” 
Congress thought it necessary to provide an alternate form of protection to 
those willing to invest in (and implement) “effective” technological 
measures.26  Section 1201 “does not mandate the adoption of any . . . 
technological protection;” it merely “takes those technological measures 
that win adoption because of their efficacy and confers [statutory] 
protection on them.”27  If, as Congress suggested, the circumvention of a 
technological measure designed to protect a copyrighted work truly is “the 
electronic equivalent of breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a 
copy of a book,” providing a legal remedy if the lock fails seems entirely 
reasonable and appropriate.28 
III. THE (UN)COPYRIGHT 
¶10 Section 1201’s presence in Title 17 of the United States Code belies 
the fact that it is not truly a copyright law.29  Section 1201 neither confers 
nor modifies any property rights.30  Instead, the statute merely sanctions a 
new method of protecting copyrighted works—technological access 
controls.31  Perhaps surprisingly, § 1201 does not even reserve its benefits 
for copyright owners;32 it affords the same protection to all persons, 
regardless of whether they actually own the copyrights to the work they are 
protecting.33 
                                                     
25 Id. at 8.  Citing portions of the Copyright and Communications Acts—
provisions 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c) and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4)—the Senate Judiciary 
Committee noted that such anti-circumvention is not unprecedented. Id. 
26Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000), aff’d., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
27 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.03 (2007). 
28 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(I), at 17 (1998). 
29 See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 
1192–94 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
30 Id. at 1192. 
31 Id. at 1194. 
32 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006) (“Any person injured by a violation of section 1201 . 
. . may bring a civil action in an appropriate United States district court for such 
violation.”). 
33 The provisions of § 1201 directly address “work[s] protected under [Title 
17],” but do not require that the technological measures designed to protect 
those works be put in place by the copyright owner.  As such, the source of the 
technological measure may be injured by an act of circumvention despite the 
fact that his digital fence is designed to prohibit only the unauthorized access of 
a protected work for which he does not hold the copyright. 
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¶11 The curious nature of § 1201 emanates from the protection it 
affords: access control.  Section 1201(a)(1) is designed to prohibit 
individuals from accessing copyrighted works via circumvention of 
technological measures designed to protect those works.34  Section 
1201(a)(2), in contrast, prohibits trafficking in “any technology, product, 
service, device, component, or part thereof” that 1) is “primarily designed… 
for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a [copyrighted] work,”35 2) “has only a limited 
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent” an 
effective technological measure,36 or 3) “is marketed . . . for use in 
circumventing” an effective technological measure.37 
¶12 It is noteworthy that one can easily run afoul of § 1201 without 
infringing any of the traditional rights enjoyed by copyright owners.38  One 
need not make illegal copies or publicly display the copyrighted work to 
violate § 1201.  In fact, such acts clearly do not violate § 1201.  Section 
1201 is concerned only with how the work is accessed, not what is done 
to/with the copyrighted work after access is attained. 
A. Impenetrable Armor? 
¶13 In the nine years since its passage, § 1201 has been used numerous 
times to successfully thwart those seeking to facilitate unauthorized access 
to copyrighted works.39  Not surprisingly, the major industry players—
motion picture studios and the music recording industry— have been at the 
epicenter of § 1201 litigation.  They have faired very well; thus far, the 
courts who have interpreted the statute have given almost perfect deference 
to the will (though not necessarily the words) of Congress.40 
¶14 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, for example, eight 
major motion picture studios successfully employed the DMCA against 
                                                     
34 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105TH CONG., SECTION-BY-
SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998, at 5 (Comm. Print, Serial No. 6, 1998) 
[hereinafter ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281]. 
35 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
36 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
37 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
38 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006) (“Nothing in this section shall affect rights, 
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, 
under this title.”). 
39 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
40 See id. at 318 (citing to various House Committee reports regarding the 
purpose of § 1201). 
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defendants who posted DVD decrypting software on their website.41  
Reimerdes is a prime example of the type of analysis that is usually applied 
to § 1201 cases.  As such, it is worthwhile to delve into the court’s 
rationale. 
¶15 Unlike traditional, analog video, digital video can easily be 
replicated without appreciable degradation.42  For obvious reasons, the 
movie studios were apprehensive about the threat of piracy when they 
developed DVD technology.43  So, in the mid-1990s, the studios got 
together with the consumer electronics industry and formulated a plan to 
protect their investment.44  Their partnership gave birth to the Content 
Scramble System (“CSS”).45 
¶16 CSS is a system whereby the sound and graphic files that constitute 
a DVD motion picture are encrypted according to a defined algorithm.46  “A 
CSS-protected DVD can be decrypted by an appropriate decryption 
algorithm that employs a series of keys stored on the DVD and the DVD 
player.”47  The technology for making CSS-compliant DVD players was 
licensed to consumer electronics manufacturers “subject to strict security 
requirements,” which were designed to ensure that the keys to this newly-
minted content lockbox were kept hidden from the public.48 
¶17 Despite their meager efforts, the movie studios were unable to 
secure the digital content contained within their DVDs.  In the fall of 1999, 
a Norwegian teenager named Jon Johansen successfully cracked the 
encryption scheme.49  By reverse engineering a licensed DVD player, Mr. 
Johansen uncovered both the CSS encryption algorithm and the keys needed 
to operate the lock.50 
¶18 Johansen and his colleagues utilized the information they gleaned 
from the DVD player to create a computer program capable of decrypting 
and “ripping” encrypted DVDs, thereby allowing them to both play the 
DVDs on non-compliant computers and copy the decrypted files to 
computer hard drives.51  Mr. Johansen then shared his computer program 
with the world by posting the executable code on his personal Internet web 
                                                     
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 309. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 309-10. 
47 Id. at 310. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 311. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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site.52  Since that time, his program “has become widely available on the 
Internet, where hundreds of sites now purport to offer the software for 
download.”53 
¶19 Mr. Johansen’s program, DeCSS, lies at the heart of Reimerdes.  
The primary defendant, Eric Corley, is a self-proclaimed cyber 
revolutionary.54  In addition to publishing a magazine called 2600: The 
Hacker Quarterly, Corley also operates a website55 dedicated to various 
hacker-related interests.56  When Corley’s web site began to offer direct 
downloads of DeCSS, as well as links to “mirror” sites where visitors could 
download the decryption software, the motion picture industry sought a 
legal remedy.57 
¶20 The anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201 provided the studios 
with ammunition.  Although Corley was not himself accused of 
circumventing the studios’ access controls,58 he had almost certainly 
violated § 1201(a)(2) by trafficking in circumvention technology.59  Mr. 
Corley, and those like him, were exactly the type of pirates that § 1201 was 
designed to capture. 
¶21 The district court first found that DeCSS constitutes “technology” 
within the meaning of § 1201(a)(2).60  Further, the court held that DeCSS 
was primarily designed to circumvent CSS.61  Indeed, as the court noted, 
“that is all it does.”62  Accordingly, Corley’s posting of DeCSS was found 
to be a prima facie violation of §§ 1201(a)(2)(A) and 1201(a)(2)(B).63 
¶22 DeCSS was clearly designed to circumvent the technological 
measure protecting CSS-encrypted digital video.  That, however, is not 
                                                     
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 See id. at 308 (“Corley is viewed as a leader of the computer hacker 
community and goes by the name Emmanuel Goldstein, after the leader of the 
underground in George Orwell’s classic, 1984.”). 
55 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, http://www.2600.com (last visited Jan. 21, 
2009). 
56 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308. 
57 Id. at 312. 
58 Id. at 316. 
59 See id. at 312, 317 (stating that Corley “offered and provided and, absent a 
court order, would continue to offer and provide DeCSS to the public by making 
it available for download on the 2600.com web site”). 
60 Id. at 317. 
61 Id. at 318. 
62 Id.  Based upon the court’s finding, DeCSS must have no “commercially 
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure.”  
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
63 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319. 
200x DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. x 
enough to satisfy § 1201.  The anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201 
apply only to the circumvention of technological measures that “effectively 
control[] access to a work protected under [Title 17].”64 
¶23 At trial, Corley and his fellow defendants argued that CSS, “which 
is based on a 40-bit encryption key, is a weak cipher that does not 
‘effectively control’ access to [the studios’] copyrighted works.”65  Corley’s 
argument was based on a marked misreading of (or complete failure to read) 
§ 1201.  Corley’s contention—that successful circumvention proves that the 
technological measure was not effective—is, as the district court aptly 
remarked, “indefensible.”66  “The mere circumstance that [a] defendant has 
deactivated the subject technology cannot mean that the technology fails to 
offer ‘effective control’ as otherwise the statute would be rendered 
nonsensical.”67 
¶24 In holding that CSS “effectively controls” access to the copyrighted 
work,68 the court purported to focus its attention on the statutory definition 
provided in § 1201(a)(3).69  Section 1201(a)(3)(B) stipulates that 
“effective” control requires the “authority of the copyright owner.”  Without 
the authority of the studios, it reasoned, Corley could not have “legally 
gain[ed] access to the keys” needed to decrypt the CSS algorithm.70  Ergo, 
CSS must be “effective” because the copyright owner’s permission is 
required in order to properly operate the system. 
¶25 “This view,” the court declared, “is confirmed by the legislative 
history.”71  The House Judiciary Committee’s section-by-section analysis of 
§ 1201 states that “[t]he practical, commonsense approach taken by [the 
statute] is that if, in the ordinary course of its operation, a technology 
actually works in the defined ways to control access . . . then the 
‘effectiveness’ test is met, and the prohibitions of the statute are 
applicable.”72  The “ordinary course of operation” for CSS, the court 
determined, is confined to those instances “when DeCSS or some other 
decryption program is not employed.”73  Since CSS “actually works” in 
those instances, it is an “effective” technological measure.74 
                                                     
64 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (2006). 
65 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317. 
66 Id. 
67 NIMMER, supra note 27. 
68 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318. 
69 See id. at 317–18. 
70 Id. at 317. 
71 Id. at 318. 
72 ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281, supra note 34, at 10. 
73 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318. 
74 Id. 
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¶26 Following Reimerdes, the entertainment industry giants have used 
§ 1201 to wage a very successful campaign against media pirates.  In 321 
Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., several prominent members 
of the Motion Picture Association of America attained an injunction against 
the unauthorized distribution of computer software that was capable of both 
decrypting and copying CSS-protected DVDs.75  Likewise, Sony 
successfully invoked § 1201 to obtain an injunction against the owner of a 
website that sold various devices designed to circumvent the authentication 
process guarding its PlayStation game consoles.76 
B.  Porous Sieve? 
¶27 Based upon the overwhelming success enjoyed by the content 
owners who have asserted their right to control access under § 1201, one 
might assume that the statute provides ironclad protection against content 
thieves.  Yet the rather superficial statutory interpretation undertaken by the 
majority of courts to interpret § 1201 masks a fatal flaw in the statute’s 
language.  Upon closer examination, the seemingly foolproof protection of 
§ 1201 appears quite porous. 
¶28 In I.M.S. Inquiry Management Systems, Ltd. v. Berkshire 
Information Systems, Inc.,77 the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York issued a rather shocking ruling.  Rather than 
cut and paste the standard logic employed in the court’s Reimerdes decision, 
the panel took a more critical look at the language of the statute.78  In what 
may be the first of many losses for the content industry,79 the court held that 
                                                     
75 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 
1105 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that distribution 
of the software did not violate the DMCA, or, in the alternative, that the anti-
circumvention provisions were invalid; plaintiffs were disappointed in both 
respects.  Id. 
76 Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Divineo, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006). 
77 I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 
521,  531–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
78 See id. at 532 (“Circumvention requires either descrambling, decrypting, 
avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating or impairing a technological 
measure qua technological measure.  In the instant matter, defendant is not said 
to have avoided or bypassed the deployed technological measure in the 
measure’s gatekeeping capacity. . . .  [Here], what defendant avoided and 
bypassed was permission to engage and move through the technological 
measure from the measure's author.”). 
79 “I.M.S. was correctly decided.  Circumvention, as defined in the DMCA, is 
limited to actions that ‘descramble,’ ‘decrypt,’ ‘avoid, bypass, remove, 
deactivate or impair a technological measure.’  What is missing from this 
statutory definition is any reference to ‘use’ of a technological measure without 
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the “unauthorized use of an otherwise legitimate, owner-issued password” 
does not constitute a violation of § 1201.80  In so doing, it highlighted a 
potentially devastating chink in the DMCA’s armor: § 1201(a)(3). 
IV. CHINKS IN THE ARMOR 
¶29 The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether its 
language has a plain, unambiguous meaning.81  “Where the language is 
plain and admits to no more than one meaning . . . the rules which are to aid 
in doubtful meanings need no discussion.82  As Chief Justice Marshall once 
stated, if the language of the statute is plain, “it must be obeyed.”83 
¶30 Section 1201 is unequivocal in its terms.  It forbids the 
circumvention of technological measures that “effectively control” access to 
copyrighted works84 and trafficking in certain articles that make such 
circumvention possible.85  According to the language of the statute,if the 
technological measure does not “effectively control[] access to a 
[copyrighted] work,” no amount of circumvention is forbidden. 
¶31 Section 1201(a)(3) clearly delineates the bounds of “digital 
trespass.”86  Both of the access control provisions found in § 1201—the 
normal anti-circumvention provision found in § 1201(a)(1) and the anti-
trafficking provision located in § 1201(a)(2)—are governed by the statutory 
definitions laid out in § 1201(a)(3).  The definitions in § 1201(a)(3) firmly 
establish the limits of those activities that fall within the purview of the 
statute’s access controls.  Section 1201(a)(3) provides: 
(A) to “circumvent a technological measure” means to 
descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted 
work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, 
                                                                                                                       
the authority of the copyright owner, and the court declines to manufacture such 
language now.”  Egilman v. Keller & Heckman, LLP, 401 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 
(D.D.C. 2005). 
80 See I.M.S. v. Berkshire, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 531–33. 
81 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). 
82 Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899). 
83 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (emphasis added). 
84 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“No person shall circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under 
[Title 17].”). 
85 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006) (“No person shall manufacture, import, offer to 
the public, provide or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, 
device, component, or part thereof . . . .”). 
86 Chamberlain Group, Inc.v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1196 (“[T]he 
DMCA created circumvention liability for ‘digital trespass’ under § 
1201(a)(1).”). 
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deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without 
the authority of the copyright owner; and  
(B) a technological measure “effectively controls access to 
a work” if the measure, in the ordinary course of its 
operation, requires the application of information, or a 
process or a treatment, with the authority of the 
copyright owner, to gain access to the work.87 
¶32 The statutory definitions provided in § 1201(a)(3) create two 
loopholes in the access controls designed to discourage digital piracy.  
Section 1201(a)(3)(A) provides only a small chink in the DMCA’s access-
control armor: a relatively narrow definition of “circumvention.”  Section 
1201(a)(3)(B), on the other hand, effectively obliterates whatever protection 
is left. 
A. Circumvention . . . is sometimes possible 
¶33 As defined in § 1201(a)(3)(A), circumvention involves any effort to 
“descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise 
to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, 
without the authority of the copyright owner.”  Except for descrambling and 
decrypting, circumvention requires activity outside the normal scope of 
operation, some action undertaken to avoid the normal processes by which 
the technological measure operates.  Mere lack of authority to utilize the 
process is not enough to trigger § 1201(a)(3)(A). 
¶34 One cannot “circumvent a technological measure” simply by 
utilizing a legitimate password without authorization.88  Such conduct does 
not avoid or bypass the technological measure; it uses an appropriate key in 
precisely the manner in which the key was designed to function.  The fact 
that the use of the key was unauthorized is irrelevant because 
“circumvention” is explicitly limited to the activities listed in 
§ 1201(a)(3)(A).  
¶35 The descrambling and decrypting of protected content presents a 
more difficult problem: any unauthorized use of the proper key leads 
directly to the forbidden activity.89  The shortcomings of the statutory 
language with regard to avoidance and bypass are subsumed by the very 
                                                     
87 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3) (2006). 
88 I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 
521, 531–33 (S.D.N.Y 2004).  Contra Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 
111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer 
Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
89 Were it not for § 1201(a)(3)(A)’s explicit inclusion of decryption in the 
statutory definition, the unauthorized use of even the most complex encryption 
key might arguably fit into the avoid-bypass loophole. 
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nature of decryption and descrambling technology.  Whereas the use of a 
key consisting of a simple password allows one to slip through a loophole in 
the language of the statute, any unauthorized use of a complex encryption 
key (that succeeds in decrypting the work) amounts to circumvention of a 
technological measure.90 
B. Effective Control . . . is virtually nonexistent 
¶36 If § 1201(a)(3)(A) was the only statutorily-defined limitation 
included in the access controls of § 1201, it would be fairly easy for content 
owners to avoid the “circumvention” loophole and achieve the desired 
protection.  Simply by encrypting or scrambling their data, they could 
establish a foolproof protection scheme—any unauthorized use of the 
appropriate decryption/descrambling key would amount to 
“circumvention,” as would any effort to “avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, 
or impair” the decryption/scrambling technology.  The makers and 
distributors of decryption/descrambling devices would have virtually no 
chance of escaping liability. 
¶37 Fortunately for all of the scurvy pirates out there, the Information 
Technology Industry Council lobbied hard for the inclusion of an explicit 
definition of what constitutes an “effective” technological measure.91  In 
particular, they wanted to specify that “effective” technological measures 
“must be strong, ‘active’ measures, such as encryption or scrambling, which 
obscure the content itself.”92  “Implementing legislation that did not draw a 
clear distinction between ‘effective’ technological measures and all others,” 
they feared, “would leave us with a Hobbesian choice of producing slow, 
‘legal’ computers or fast, ‘illegal’ computers.”93  A noble effort for a 
worthy cause, but it resulted in a second loophole that is much bigger than 
the first! 
¶38 Section § 1201(a)(3)(B) states that “a technological measure 
‘effectively controls access to a work’ if the measure, in the ordinary course 
of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a 
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the 
work.”94  In other words, a technological measure is not “effective” unless 
                                                     
90 This is so because the language of § 1201(a)(3)(A) with regard to 
descrambling & decrypting is framed in terms of the result achieved, not the 
action taken. 
91 See Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecomm. Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong.(1998) (statement of Chris Byrne, Silicon Graphics, Inc., 
on behalf of the Information Technology Industry Council). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2006). 
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it ordinarily requires two things: 1) the application of some information or 
process, and 2) “the authority of the copyright owner.”95  The inclusion of 
the latter requirement is effectively a death knell to the anti-circumvention 
provisions of § 1201. 
¶39 Virtually all technological measures require “the application of 
information, or a process or a treatment.”96  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
the existence of a technological measure that granted access in the absence 
of such an application.  Even the most rudimentary access controls—such as 
the automatic doors at your local pharmacy—require the application of 
information (i.e., that you have just broken the plane of its motion detecting 
radar, or stepped on its pressure-sensitive floor mat) in order to grant access 
to the user. 
¶40 The majority of technological access controls do not, however, 
require “the authority of the copyright owner.”  If the appropriate 
information or process is applied, the technological measure will grant 
access regardless of whether the party applying the required information or 
process actually had permission to engage the system.  Because the 
information or process applied to engage the access control is identical in 
both the legitimate and illicit contexts, the technological measure is not, 
itself, capable of distinguishing between those two applications.  As such, 
the vast majority of technological measures do not fulfill the latter 
requirement of § 1201(a)(3)(B), and therefore do not “effectively control[] 
access to a [copyrighted] work.” 
V. WHAT’S WRONG WITH REIMERDES? 
¶41 This strict, textual interpretation of § 1201(a)(3) is directly at odds 
with prior case law, which gave a much broader reading to the language of 
the statute.  In what appears to be an effort to give life to the intent of 
Congress, the courts interpreting § 1201 have thus far glossed over the 
critical language of § 1201(a)(3)(B).97  In Reimerdes, for instance, the court 
completely divorced the technological measure from the authority 
                                                     
95 Id. 
96 By definition, a “technological” measure must relate to or involve technology.  
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 
2004), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/technological.  
Technology, in turn, necessitates the practical application of science or other 
such information.  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004), available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/technology. 
97 Even the I.M.S. v. Berkshire court ignored the authority requirement of 
§ 1201(a)(3)(B).  See I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., 
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 531 (S.D.N.Y 2004). 
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requirement when it evaluated the “effectiveness” of CSS encryption 
software:98 
One cannot gain access to a CSS-protected work on a DVD without 
application of the three keys that are required by the software.  One 
cannot lawfully gain access to the keys except by entering into a 
license with . . . the copyright owners or by purchasing a DVD player 
or drive containing the keys pursuant to a license.  In consequence, . . . 
CSS ‘effectively controls access’ to copyrighted DVDs.99
This same flawed logic has been rehashed in subsequent cases.100
¶42 Section 1201 does not contain a separate requirement that the 
“keys” required to open a technological access control—the information or 
process required by the technological measure—be “lawfully obtained.”  
Section 1201(a)(3)(B) clearly never addresses how those “keys” were 
obtained; it requires only that the technological measure actually requires 
their application.  Indeed, the statutory definition of “effective control” is 
focused solely on the operation of the technological measure itself.  There is 
no mention of content pirates or their ill-gotten “keys.” 
¶43 The only way to rectify the “effectiveness” analysis of Reimerdes 
with the text of § 1201(a)(3)(B) is to assume that the “ordinary course of [a 
technological measure’s] operation” is limited to situations wherein the 
party “lawfully gain[s] access to the keys”101 required to engage that 
measure.  That assumption, however, cannot be valid.  Were it true, the 
validity of that assumption would render the authority requirement of the 
provision completely superfluous.  By explicitly defining “effective” 
technological measures as those that refuse to grant access in the absence of 
“the authority of the copyright owner,” § 1201 implicitly acknowledges that 
all technological measures do not contain such a requirement as part of their 
“ordinary course of operation.”  Consequently, it is erroneous to assume 
that the “ordinary course of [CSS] operation” (or that of any other access 
control) inherently requires permission to engage the technological 
measure. 
¶44 A court must therefore make a factual finding that a given 
technological measure (not the measure’s author) in fact requires that the 
user have authority to use the key as part of its “ordinary course of 
                                                     
98 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 317–18 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
99 Id. 
100 See, e.g., 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 
2d 1085, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting Reimerdes for the proposition that CSS 
is an “effective” technological measure). 
101 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317–18. 
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operation.”  But, as was previously discussed,102 such a determination must 
undoubtedly be based upon a legal fiction.  In reality, technological 
measures cannot distinguish between the application of identical 
information by a legitimate user and a key-thieving pirate. 
¶45 It is not enough that the court thinks that the measure should require 
such authority.  The statute plainly mandates that the measure must actually 
require “the authority of the copyright owner.” 
VI. A CALL TO AMEND 
¶46 If the DMCA is to provide an effective safeguard for technological 
access controls, it must be amended to close the loopholes present in 
§ 1201(a)(3).  The shortcomings of the statute are not merely semantic—
one of the loopholes has already been judicially exposed,103 and it is only a 
matter of time before the other is asserted.  Indeed, pirates who find 
themselves accused of violating § 1201—and those generally opposed to the 
DMCA’s access controls—would be wise to mount a defense based upon 
the technical language of §§ 1201(a)(3)(A) and 1201(a)(3)(B). 
¶47 However tempted they may be, courts should resist the urge to 
judicially rewrite § 1201 to say what they “know” it is supposed to say.  “It 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is,”104 not what it should be.  “Statutory construction must,” 
therefore, “begin with the language employed by Congress and the 
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses 
the legislative purpose.”105  For “where the language of the act is explicit, 
there is great danger in departing from the words used, to give an effect to 
the law which may be supposed to have been designed by the 
legislature.”106 
¶48 Moreover, courts should avoid rushing to judgment about 
Congress’ intentions regarding the access controls (supposedly) embodied 
in § 1201.  Given the current state of unrest amongst content users and legal 
academics,107 it would be wise to force Congress to wrestle with the 
                                                     
102 See supra pp. 14–15. 
103 See I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. 
Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y 2004).. 
104 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
105 Park ‘n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). 
106 Denn v. Reid, 35 U.S. 525, 527 (1836). 
107 See generally Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Really Created a New Exclusive Right of Access?: Attempting to Reach a 
Balance Between Users’ and Content Providers’ Rights, 49 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 277 (2001); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy 
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provisions of § 1201.  If Congress truly wishes to provide the U.S. 
copyright industry with impenetrable access controls, it is certainly free to 
amend the statute.108  Simply strengthening the language of § 1201(a)(3) 
should not be a daunting task—provided, of course, that granting such 
strong access controls is still the will of Congress. 
¶49 The E.U. Directive enacting the relevant portions of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty provides one example of language that would aptly 
express the supposed will of Congress.109  There, “effective” technological 
measures are defined as those whereby “the use of a protected work . . . is 
controlled by the rightholders through application of an access control or 
protection process . . . which achieves the protection objective.”110  So long 
as “the protection objective” is defined to be something akin to “a 
substantial reduction in the likelihood of unauthorized access,” adoption of 
the aforementioned language would extend the protection of § 1201 to 
virtually all technological access controls. 
CONCLUSION 
¶50 In its present state, § 1201 does not provide strong legal protection 
for technological measures designed to prevent the unauthorized access of 
copyrighted works.  With a few minor tweaks in the language of the statute, 
however, it could become a legitimate bulwark against the ever-increasing 
threat of digital piracy.  The courts, should not be the instrument of that 
change.  Instead, the courts should pursue their traditional duties with 
increased fervor, faithfully giving life to the plain meaning of § 1201.  
Leave to Congress the job of closing the loopholes. 
                                                                                                                       
Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111 (2005). 
108 Indeed, three proposed amendments to the language of § 1201 are already on 
the floor of Congress.  H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3155, 110th Cong. 
(2007); S. 2317, 110th Cong. (2007). 
109 See Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC). 
110 Id. art. 17. 
